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Abstract
Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation
and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the
entire supply in advance. These allocation and pricing decisions get complicated when buyers
have some global constraints. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have
global budget constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is
to show that for this setting there is an individually-rational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-
optimal auction that allocates these units and calculates prices on the fly, without knowledge of
the total supply. We do so by showing that the Adaptive Clinching Auction satisfies a supply-
monotonicity property.
We also analyze and discuss, using examples, how the insights gained by the allocation and
payment rule can be applied to design better ad allocation heuristics in practice. Finally, while
our main technical result concerns multi-unit supply, we propose a formal model of online supply
that captures scenarios beyond multi-unit supply and has applications to sponsored search. We
conjecture that our results for multi-unit auctions can be extended to these more general models.
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1 Introduction
The problem of selling advertisement on the web is essentially an online problem - the supply
(pageviews) arrives dynamically and decisions on how to allocate ads to pageviews and price these
ads need to be taken instantaneously, without full knowledge of the future supply. What makes
these decisions complex is the fact that buyers have budget constraints, which ties the allocation
and pricing decisions across different time steps. Another complicating feature of the online adver-
tisement markets is that buyers are strategic and can misreport their values to their own advantage.
These observations have sparkled a fruitful line of research in two different directions. First
is that of designing online algorithms where one assumes that the supply is coming online, but
makes a simplifying assumption that buyers are non-strategic. This line of research has led to novel
tools and techniques in the design of online algorithms (see for example [14, 5, 8, 1]). The second
line of research considers the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms assuming that buyers
are strategic, but makes an assumption that the supply is known beforehand. Handling budget
constraints using truthful mechanisms is non-trivial since standard VCG-like techniques fail when
the player utilities are not quasi-linear. In a seminal work, Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [9] showed
that one can adapt Ausubel’s clinching auction [2] to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes for the case
of multi-unit supply. In settings with budget constraints, the goal of maximizing social welfare is
unattainable and efficiency is achieved through Pareto-optimal outcomes. In fact, if budgets are
sufficiently large, Pareto-optimal outcomes are exactly the ones that maximize social welfare [11].
From a practical standpoint, it is important to understand what can be done when both the
above scenarios are present at the same time. Motivated by this, we study the following question
in this paper: Can one design efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for the case when agents
have budget constraints and the supply arrives online?
A closely related question was studied by Babaioff, Blumrosen and Roth [3], who asked weather
it was possible to obtain efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms with online supply, but instead
of budget constraints, they considered capacity constraints, i.e., each agent wants at most k items
(capacity) rather than having at most B dollars to spend (budget). They showed that no such
mechanism can be efficient and proved lower bounds on the efficiency that could be achieved.
Such lower bounds seem to offer a grim perspective on what can be done with budget constraints,
since typically, budget constraints are less well-behaved than capacity constraints. On the contrary,
and somewhat surprisingly, we show that for budget constraints it is possible to obtain incentive
compatible and Pareto-optimal auctions that allocate and charge for items as they arrive, by showing
that the Adaptive Clinching Auction in [9] for multi-unit supply can be implemented in an online
manner. More formally, we show that the clinching auction for the multi-unit supply case satisfies
the following supply-monotonicity property: Given the allocation and payments obtained by running
the auction for initial supply s, one can obtain the allocation and payments for any other supply
s′ ≥ s by augmenting to the auction outcome for supply s. In other words, it is possible to find an
allocation for the extra s′ − s items and extra (non-negative) payments such that when added to
clinching auction outcome for the supply s, we obtain the clinching auction outcome for supply s′.
Moreover, we show that each agent’s utility is also monotone with respect to the supply, i.e., agents
do not have incentive to leave the auction prematurely.
From a technical perspective, proving the above result requires a deeper understanding of the
structure of the clinching auction, which in general is difficult to analyze because it is described
using a differential ascending price procedure rather than a one-shot outcome like VCG. In order to
do so, we study the description of the clinching auction given by Bhattacharya, Conitzer, Munagala
and Xia [4] by means of a differential equation. At its heart, the proof of the supply monotonicity
is a coupling argument. We analyze two parallel differential procedures whose limits correspond to
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the outcome of the clinching auction with the same values and budgets but different initial supplies.
We prove that either one stays ahead of the other or they meet and from this point on they evolve
identically (for carefully chosen concepts of ‘stay ahead’ and ‘meet’). We identify many different
invariants in the differential description of the auction, and use tools from real analysis to show
that these invariants hold.
Towards better heuristics for ad-allocation. One of the main goals of this research program
is to provide insights for the design of better heuristics to deal with budget-constrained agents in real
ad auctions. Most heuristics in practice are based on bid-throttling or bid-lowering. Bid-throttling
probabilistically removes a player from the auction based on her spent budget (throttling). Bid-
lowering runs a standard second price auction with modified bids. While sound from an algorithmic
perspective, bid-throttling and bid-lowering are not integrated with the underlying auction from
the perspective of incentives. We believe clinching auctions provide better insights into designing
heuristics that are more robust to strategic behavior. Towards this goal, we analyze the online
allocation rule obtained from the clinching auction and provide a qualitative description of how
allocation and payments evolve when new items arrive, and show how this description is significantly
different from the bid-throttling or bid-lowering heuristics that are applied in practice. In clinching,
the fact that an agent got many items for an expensive price in the beginning (once the items were
scarce) gives him an advantage over items in the future if/once they become abundant, i.e., this
agent will have the possibility of acquiring these items for a lower price than the other agents.
Online supply beyond Multi Unit Auctions. Since the groundbreaking work of Dobzinski,
Lavi and Nisan [9], clinching auctions have been extended beyond multi-unit auctions in the offline-
supply setting: first to matching markets by Fiat, Leonardi, Saia and Sankowski [10], then to
sponsored search setting by Colini-Baldeschi, Henzinger, Leonardi and Starnberger [6] and to general
polymatroids by Goel, Mirrokni and Paes Leme [11]. It is natural to ask if such offline-auctions
have online supply counterparts.
We leave this question as the main open problem in this paper. However, before one formulates
this question, we need to define what we mean by online supply in such settings. One contribution of
this paper is to define a model of online supply for allocation constraints beyond multi-units. Using
our definition of online supply for generic constraints and the definition of AdWords Polytope in
[11], we can capture for example: (1) sponsored search with multiple slots, where for each pageview
we need to decide on an allocation of agents to slots and (ii) matching constraints: each arriving
pageview can only be allocated to a subset of advertisers.
Related Work. The study of auctions with online supply was initiated in Mahdian and Saberi
[12] who study multi-unit auctions with the objective of maximizing revenue. They provide a
constant competitive auction with the optimal offline single-price revenue. Devanur and Hartline
[7] study this problem in both the Bayesian and prior-free model. In the Bayesian model, they
argue that there is no separation between the online and offline problem. This discussion is then
extended to the prior-free setting. The results in [7] assume that the payments can be deferred
until all supply is realized, while allocation needs to be done online.
Our work is more closely related to the work by Babaioff, Blumrosen and Roth [3], which study
the online supply model with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Unlike previous work, they
insist (as we also do) that payments are charged in an online manner. This is a desirable property
from a practical standpoint, since it allows players to monitor their spend in real-time. Their results
are mainly negative: they prove lower bounds on the approximability of social welfare in setting
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where the supply is online. Efficiency is only recovered when stochastic information on the supply
is available.
We should also note that there is a long line of research at the intersection of online algorithms
and mechanism design, mostly dealing with agents arriving and departing in an online manner. We
refer to Parkes [16] for a survey.
Another stream of related works comes from the literature on mechanism design with budget
constrained agent. This line of inquire was initiated in Dobzinski et al [9], who proposed a mech-
anism based on Ausubel’s celebrated clinching framework [2]. The authors propose a mechanism
for multi-unit auctions and indivisible goods and a mechanism for 2 players and divisible goods
called the Adaptive Clinching Auction. The mechanism is extended to n players by Bhattacharya
et al [4] by means of a differential ascending process whose limit is the allocation and payments
of the Adaptive Clinching Auction. The authors also show how to use randomization to enable
the auction to handle private budgets. Many subsequent papers deal with extending the clinching
auctions to more general environments beyond multi-units: Fiat el al [10], Colini-Baldeschi et al [6]
and Goel et al [11].
2 Preliminary Definitions
An auction is defined by a set of n players equipped with utility functions and an environment,
which specifies the set of feasible allocations. Formally, we consider a divisible1 good g such that
an allocation of this good will be represented by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), meaning that player i
got xi units of the good. Player i has a set of private types Θi and his utility function will depend
on his type θi, the amount xi he is allocated and the amount of money πi he is charged for it. We
will represent it by a function ui(θi, xi, πi). Moreover, we will consider a set P ⊆ R
n
+ that specifies
the set of feasible allocations. We will call such set the environment.
Definition 2.1 An auction for this setting consists of two mappings: the allocation x : ×iΘi → P
and the payment π : ×iΘi → R
n
+. The auction is said to be individually rational if ui(θi, xi(θ), πi(θ)) ≥
0 for all type vectors θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). The auction is said to be incentive-compatible (a.k.a. truthful)
if no player can improve his utility by misreporting his type, i.e.:
ui(θi, xi(θi, θ−i), πi(θi, θ−i)) ≥ ui(θi, xi(θ
′
i, θ−i), πi(θ
′
i, θ−i)),∀θ
′
i, θi ∈ Θi,∀i
In this paper, we will be particularly interested in agents with budget-constrained utility functions.
For this setting Θi = R+ representing the value vi the agent has for one unit of the good. There
is a public budget Bi such that: ui(vi, xi, πi) = vi · xi − πi if πi ≤ Bi and −∞ otherwise. Incentive
compatibility for this setting means that the agents don’t have incentives to misreport their value.
For this setting, we are interested in auctions producing Pareto-optimal outcomes:
Definition 2.2 Given an auction with environment P and agents equipped with budget-constrained
utility functions, Bi being the public budgets, we say that an outcome (x, π), x ∈ P, π ≤ B is Pareto
optimal if there is no alternative outcome x′ ∈ P, π′ ≤ B such that vix
′
i − π
′
i ≥ vixi − πi for all i,∑
i π
′
i ≥
∑
i πi and at least one of those inequalities is strict.
1our decision of considering divisible goods is motivated by our application. In sponsored search, the number of
items (pageviews) arriving at each time is enormous, making fractional allocations essentially feasible.
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For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that budgets are public for simplicity. For
multi-unit auctions (i.e. P = {x;
∑
i xi ≤ s}), our results extend to private budgets by applying
the budget elicitation schemes in Bhattacharya el al [4].
3 Online Supply Model
We consider auctions where the feasibility set is not known in advance to the auctioneer. For each
time t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, we associate an environment Pt ⊆ R
n
+, which keeps track of the allocations
done in times t′ = 1..t 2. In each step, the mechanism needs to output an allocation vector
xt = (xt1, . . . , x
t
n) ∈ Pt and a payment vector π
t = (πt1, . . . , π
t
n) ≥ 0 by augmenting x
t−1 and πt−1.
Given a set of desirable properties, we would like to maintain them for all t. To make the problem
tractable, have to restrict the set of possible histories {Pt}t≥0. We do so by defining a partial
ordering 4 on the set of feasibility constraints such that if t ≤ s then Pt 4 Ps.
Our main goal is to design auctions where the auctioneer can allocate and charge payments ‘on
the fly’. The auctioneer will face a set of environments P1 4 P2 4 . . . 4 Pt and at time t, he needs
to allocate xt ∈ Pt and charge π
t, maintaining a set of desirable properties. He doesn’t know if
Pt will be the final outcome, or if some new environment Pt+1 < Pt will arrive, in which case he
will need to augment xt ∈ Pt to an allocation x
t+1 in Pt+1. It is crucial that his decision at time t
doesn’t depend the knowledge about Pt+1.
Definition 3.1 (Online Supply Model) Consider a family of feasibility allocation constraints
indexed by F , i.e, for each f ∈ F associate a set of feasible allocation vectors P f ⊆ Rn+ (a set P
f
is often called environment). Also, consider a partial order 4 defined over F such that if f 4 f ′
then P f ⊆ P f
′
. An auction for environment P f consists of functions xf : Θ = ×iΘi → P
f and
πf : Θ→ Rn+.
An auction in the strong online supply model for (F ,4) is a family of auctions such that
xf ≤ xf
′
and πf ≤ πf
′
whenever f 4 f ′. Moreover, we say that the auction satisfies a certain
property if it satisfies this property for each f (e.g. the auction is incentive compatible if for each
f ∈ F , (xf , πf ) is an incentive compatible auction).
An auction in the weak online supply model for (F ,4) is essentially the same, except that
we drop the requirement of πf ≤ πf
′
. The intuition is that we are required to allocate goods online,
but are allowed to charge payments only in the end.
The main idea behind the definition is that if at some point the auctioneer runs the auction
(xf , πf ) for some environment P f and at a later time some more goods arrive perhaps with new
constraints such that the environment is augmented to P f
′
with f ′ < f , then the auctioneer can
run (xf
′
, πf
′
) and augment the allocation of player i by xf
′
i (v)− x
f
i (v) goods and charge him more
πf
′
i (v)− π
f
i (v).
Example 3.2 (Multi-unit auctions) Let ∆s = {x ∈ R
n
+;
∑
i xi ≤ s} and define F
MU = {∆s; s ≥
0} and let ∆s 4
MU ∆t iff s ≤ t. Let the value of player i for one unit of the good, vi, lies in
Θi = R+. Now ui = vixi − πi. Thus, we are in a simple multi-unit auction setting. In this setting,
VCG is incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient (in the sense that it has those three
properties once run for each ∆s) auction in the strong online model for (F
MU,4MU).
2We want to stress the fact that Pt doesn’t represent the set of allocations allowed at time t, but the set of
allocations allowed until time t. The set of new possible allocations in time t is the difference between Pt and Pt−1
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Example 3.3 (Multi-unit auctions with capacities) Curiously, if players have capacity con-
straints, i.e., their utilities are ui = vimin{xi, Ci} − πi, then the VCG allocations for (F
MU,4MU)
are still monotone in the supply, but the payments are not. For example, consider two agents
with values v1 = 1, v2 = 2 and capacities C1 = C2 = 1. With supply 1, one item is allocated to
player 2 and he is charged 1. With supply 2, both players get one unit of the item, but the VCG
prices are zero. Therefore, there is no incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient in
the strong online model. Babaioff, Blumrosen and Roth [3] strengthen this result showing that no
Ω(log log n)-approximately efficient auction exists in the strong online model.
Example 3.4 (Polymatroidal auctions) Now, let FPM be the set of all polymatroidal domains
and consider the naive-partial-order 4N to be such that f 4 f ′ iff P f ⊆ P f
′
. The VCG is not even
online in the weak sense for (FPM,4N). Consider the following example:
P f = {x ∈ R2+;x1 ≤ 2, x2 ≤ 2, x1 + x2 ≤ 3} and P
f ′ = {x ∈ R2+;x1 + x2 ≤ 4}
then clearly f 4 f ′ but if v1 > v2. x
f (v) = (2, 1) but xf
′
= (4, 0) violating the monotonicity property.
But now, let’s define a different partial order 4PM such that f 4PM f ′ if there is a polymatroid P ′
such that P f
′
= P f + P ′ where the sum is the Minkowski sum. In Lemma A.1 (Appendix A) we
show that VCG is an auction in the strong online model for (FPM,4PM).
One interesting property of incentive-compatible auctions in the online supply model is that
utilities are monotone with the supply. If bidders have the option of leaving in each timestep
collecting their current allocations for their current payment, they still (weakly) prefer to stay until
the end of the auction.
Lemma 3.5 (Utility monotonicity) Consider a setting where agents have single-parameter val-
uations Θi = R+ and quasilinear utilities ui = vixi − πi. Given a truthful auction in the weak
online supply model and f 4 f ′, then the utility of agent i increased with the supply, i.e.: uf
′
=
vix
f ′ − πf
′
i ≥ vix
f − πfi = u
f
Proof : The proof follows directly from Myerson’s characterization [15] of payments in quasi-linear
settings: uf
′
= vix
f ′
i − π
f ′
i =
∫ vi
0 x
f ′
i (u)du ≥
∫ vi
0 x
f (u)du = vix
f − πfi = u
f .
4 Clinching Auctions and Supply Monotonicity
Our main theorem states that the Adaptive Clinching Auction (defined in Dobzinski, Lavi and
Nisan [9] and Bhattacharya el al [4]) is an incentive-compatible auction in the strong online supply
model for budget constrained agents in the multi-unit setting. Formally:
Theorem 4.1 Given n agents with public budgets Bi and single-dimensional types vi ∈ R+ such
that their utility is given by ui = vixi − πi if πi ≤ Bi and ui = −∞ otherwise, the Adaptive
Clinching Auction is an auction in the strong online supply model for (FMU,4MU). In other words,
if x(v,B, s) and π(v,B, s) is the outcome of the auction for valuation profile v, budgets B and
supply s, then if s ≤ s′, then: x(v,B, s) ≤ x(v,B, s′) and π(v,B, s) ≤ π(v,B, s′).
Notice that this is in sharp contrast with what happens in Example 3.3 where getting a Pareto
optimal auction in the strong online model is not possible, not even in an approximate way 3. This is
3for that setting, since there are no budgets, Pareto optimality boils down to efficiency.
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somewhat surprising, since capacity constraints on the allocations are usually more nicely-behaved
compared to budget constraints.
Before proving the result, we review the Adaptive Clinching Auction [4, 9], presenting it in a
way which will be more convenient for the proof.
4.1 Adaptive Clinching Auction
The clinching auction takes as input the valuation profile v, the budget profile B and the initial
supply s, then it runs a procedure based on the ascending price framework to determine final
allocation and payments. There is a price clock p, and for each price, the auction mantains4 xi(p)
denoting the current allocation of player i and Bi(p), which is the current remaining budget of
player i. Initially, xi(0) = 0 and Bi(0) = Bi, their initial budget. For each p, the auction defines
the values of the right-derivatives ∂pxi(p) and ∂pBi(p) and described its behavior in the points in
which it is discontinuous. Notice we will use ∂pf(p) to denote the right-derivative of f at p.
For simplicity, we define the auction and prove our results for valuation profiles v such that
vi 6= vj for each i 6= j (we call it a profile in generic form) This is mainly a technical assumption to
avoid over-complicating the statement and the proof. In Appendix C, we extend this for any valu-
ation profile v. For the definition and its subsequent discussion, we will use the following implicitly
defined notation:
• remnant supply: S(p) = s−
∑
i xi(p)
• active players: A(p) = {i; vi > p}
• clinching players: C(p) = {i ∈ A(p);S(p) =
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
}
• maximum remaining budget:B∗(p) = maxi∈A(p)Bi(p)
• for any function f , let f(p¯−) = limp↑p¯ f(p) and f(p¯+) = limp↓p¯ f(p)
Definition 4.2 (Adaptive Clinching Auction) Given as input a valuation vector v in generic
form, a budget vector B and initial supply s, consider the functions xi(p), Bi(p) such that:
(i) xi(0) = 0 and Bi(0) = Bi.
(ii) ∂pxi(p) =
S(p)
p
and ∂pBi(p) = −S(p) if i ∈ C(p) and ∂pxi(p) = ∂pBi(p) = 0 otherwise.
(iii) the functions xi and Bi are right-continuous at all points p, i.e., xi(p) = xi(p+) and Bi(p) =
Bi(p+) for all p and it is left-continuous at all points p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}, i.e., xi(p−) = xi(p)
and Bi(p−) = Bi(p) for all p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}
(iv) for p = vi, let δj =
[
S(vi−)−
∑
k∈A(vi)\j
Bk(vi−)
vi
]+
. For j ∈ A(vi), let xj(vi) = xj(vi−) + δj
and Bj(vi) = Bj(vi−)− viδj and for j /∈ A(vi), xj(vi) = xj(vi−) and Bj(vi) = Bj(vi−).
The existence and uniqueness of those functions follow from elementary real analysis. The
outcome associated with v,B, s is xi = limp→∞ xi(p) and πi = Bi(0) − limp→∞Bi(p). Notice that
this is well defined since x and B are constant for p > maxi vi.
The verb clinch means acquiring goods that are underdemanded at the current price. So clinch-
ing a δi amount at price p means receiving δi amount of the good and paying δip for it. When we
4note that here we prefer to index the ascending process by the price itself rather then an external variable, like
in Bhattacharya el al [4].
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refer to a player clinching some amount, either we refer to the infinitesimal clinching happening in
(ii) or the player clinching positive units in (iv).
The reader familiar with the clinching auction for indivisible goods will notice that the definition
above is nothing more than the limit as ǫ → 0 of this auction run with 1
ǫ
s indivisible goods and
valuations ǫvi per unit. This auction satisfies all the desirable properties for multi-unit auctions
with budgets:
Theorem 4.3 (Bhattacharya et al [4]) The Adaptive Clinching Auction in Definition 4.2 is
incentive-compatible, individually-rational, budget-feasible and produces Pareto-optimal outcomes.
As one can possibly guess, it is possible to solve the differential equation in each interval between
two adjacent values of vi and give an explicit description of the clinching auction. We do that in
Appendix D. Nevertheless, we mostly prove our results using the differential form in Definition 4.2
which is more insightful than the explicit version.
Example 4.4 At this point, it is instructive to consider an example of the auction. Consider an
auction between n = 4 players with valuations v = [9, 10, 11, 5.7] and B = [3, 2, 1, .5]. The functions
xi(p), Bi(p) are depicted in Figure 1. For p < p
1
0 = 3.5, the clinching set C(p) is empty. At this
price S(p10) = 1 =
2+1+0.5
3.5 =
∑
j 6=1
Bj
p
, so player 1 alone begins clinching.
Since he is clinching alone for a while, x1(p) = s− S(p). Now by derivating this expression we
get that S(p)
p
= ∂px1(p) = −∂pS(p). Solving for the supply with the condition that S(p
1
0) = 1, we
get: S(p) =
sp1
0
p
and x1(p) = s−
sp1
0
p
. This continues while no other player enters the clinching set.
The supply function S(p) is illustrated in the first part of Figure 2.
Notice that for this period, the budget of 1 is being spent while the budgets of the other agents
are intact. Eventually, the budget of 1 meets the budget of 2, and at this point, those two players
are indistinguishable from the perspective of the differential procedure as long as both are active.
Therefore, both start spending their budget at the same rate and acquiring goods at the same rate
∂px1(p) = ∂px2(p) = S(p). Since from this point on S(p) = s − x1(p) − x2(p), then
S(p)
p
=
∂px1(p) = −
1
2∂pS(p). Solving again for the supply and the boundary condition S(p
2
0) =
sp1
0
p2
0
we get:
S(p) =
sp1
0
p2
0
p2
. Using this, one can calculate x1(p) and x2(p). Both continue clinching at the same
rate until the price reaches p = v4, where player 4 exits the active set prompting the agents to clinch
a positive amount according to (iv).
Their allocation xi(p) and budgets Bi(p) are discontinuous at this point, but continue to follow
the differential procedure after this point, having their budgets all equal (not coincidentally, as we
will see in Lemma 4.11), until price p = v1 is reached and player 1 exits the active set. At this
point, all the remaining active players clinch a positive amount according to (iv) that exhausts the
supply. Therefore, allocations and budgets are constant from this point on.
One important tool in analyzing this auction is the concept of the wishful allocation. We define
a Ψi(p) as a function of xi(p) and Bi(p) which is continuous even at the points where xi(p) and
Bi(p) are not. It is carefully set up so that the discontinuities from both functions cancel out.
Intuitively, it represents a sum of what the player acquired already at the current price xi(p) with
the maximum amount he would like to acquire at this price, which is Bi(p)
p
.
Definition 4.5 (Wishful allocation) The wishful allocation is defined as Ψi(p) = xi(p) +
Bi(p)
p
.
Lemma 4.6 The wishful allocation is continuous and right-differentiable for all p ≥ 0. Moreover,
its right-derivative is given by: ∂pΨi(p) = −
Bi(p)
p2
.
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p1
0
p2
0
v4 v1
p
x1(p)
x2(p)
x3(p)
p2
0
v4 v1
p
B1(p)
B2(p)
B3(p)
Figure 1: The functions x(p) and B(p) for an auction in Example 4.4
p1
0
p2
0
S(p)
v4 v1
p
p1
0
p2
0
v4 v1
Ψ1(p)
Ψ2(p)
Ψ3(p)
Figure 2: Supply S(p) and wishful allocation Ψ(p) for an auction in Example 4.4
The proof is elementary and can be found in Appendix A. Since Ψi(p) ≥ xi(p) and is a monontone
non-increasing function converging to the final allocation as p→∞, it constantly gives us an upper
bound of the final allocation.
Now, we study some other properties of the above auction, which will be useful in the proof
of our main theorem. First we prove a Meta Lemma that sets the basic structure for most of our
proofs. The lemma is based on elementary facts of real analysis. Its proof, as well as other missing
proofs of this section can be found in Appendix A.
Meta-Lemma 4.7 Given a property Λ that depends on p, if we want to prove for all p ≥ p0, it is
enough to prove the following facts:
(a) it holds for p = p0.
(b) if Λ holds for p, then there is some ǫp > 0 such that Λ holds for [p, p+ ǫp)
(c) if Λ holds for all p′ such that p0 ≤ p
′ < p, then Λ also holds for p.
For most properties Λ that we want to prove about the Adaptive Clinching Auction, part (a)
is easy to show, part (b) requires using the right-continuity of the function and the value of the
right-derivatives given in item (ii) of Definition 4.2 and part (c) is usually proved using continuity
for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} and using part (iv) of Definition 4.2.
The first two lemmas (whose proof is based on the Meta-Lemma) state that once a player start
acquiring goods (i.e. ∂pxi(p) > 0), he continues to do so for all the prices until p becomes equal to
his value vi. All the proofs can be found in Appendix A.
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Lemma 4.8 Once a player i enters the clinching set, then he is in the clinching set until he becomes
inactive, i.e., if i ∈ C(p) for some p, then i ∈ C(p′) for all p′ ∈ [p, vi).
Lemma 4.9 For each price p and each active player i, S(p) ≤
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
.
Corollary 4.10 If at price p = vj , player i ∈ A(vj) acquires any positive amount of the good
δi > 0, then he enters in the clinching set (if he wasn’t previously), i.e., i ∈ C(vj).
A crucial observation for our proof is that the evolution of the profile of remaining budgets
follows a very structured format. At any given price, the remaining budget of an agent is either
his original budget or the maximum budget among all agents. It is instructive to observe that in
Figure 1.
Lemma 4.11 For each price p, if C(p) 6= ∅, then C(p) = {i ∈ A(p);Bi(p) = B∗(p)}.
Corollary 4.12 For each i ∈ A(p), Bi(p) = min{Bi(0), B∗(p)}.
4.2 Supply Monotonicity
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1 which is our main result. For that we fix a budget profile
B and a valuation profile v in generic form (i.e. vi 6= vj for i 6= j, which is not needed for the
proof and is mainly intended to simplify the exposition; See Appendix C). Now, we consider two
executions of the adaptive clinching auction. One with initial supply sb which we call the base
auction and one with initial supply sa ≥ sb which we call the augmented auction. Running the base
and augmented auction with the same valuations and budgets we get functions xb(p), Bb(p) and
xa(p), Ba(p). From this point on, we use superscripts b and a to refer to the base and augmented
auctions respectively. For the set of active players at a given price, we omit the superscript, since
Ab(p) = Aa(p) for all p.
As the first step toward the proof of Theorem 4.1, we prove that the payments are monotone
with the supply, that the final payment of each agent in the augmented auction is higher than in
the base auction:
Proposition 4.13 (Payment Monotonicity) Given the base and augmented auction as defined
above, then for all p ≥ 0 and all agents i, Bbi (p) ≥ B
a
i (p).
The full proof of this proposition is delicate and involves keeping track of many invariants as
the allocation and budget profiles evolve with prices. We delay the proof to Appendix B. Here we
present a warm-up to the proof that deals with the case where all values vi are very large. This
special case will highlight the core of the proof which is essentially a coupling argument. Also, we
keep the discussion here informal and delay the formal arguments to Appendix B.
Warm Up: If valuations are large compared to budgets, Ca(p) = Cb(p) = [n] for some p < mini vi
and once p¯ = mini vi is reached, some player i becomes inactive and all the other players j 6= i,
clinch their entire demand δj =
Bj(p¯−)
p¯
.
This case is nice because it allows us to ignore part (iv) of Definition 4.2 and simply analyze
the continuous function defined in [0, p¯) by part (ii) of the definition. We start by defining pa0 =
min{p;Ca(p) 6= ∅} and pb0 = min{p;C
b(p) 6= ∅}. Since the supply is larger in the augmented
auction, pa0 < p
b
0. Then we can divide the analysis in three intervals: in the interval [0, p
a
0) where
no player is clinching, so budgets are constant, i.e., equal to the initial budget. In the interval
[pa0, p
b
0) no player is clinching in the base auction but some are clinching in the augmented auction,
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so clearly the remaining budgets are larger in the base auction. For the remaining interval [pb0,∞)
we can use Corollary 4.12 to see that all we need to show is that since both clinching sets are
non-empty we just need to prove that Ba∗(p) ≤ B
b
∗(p) for all p ∈ [p
b
0,∞). This is true for p = p
b
0 by
continuity of Ba∗ and B
b
∗ (since p < mini vi). Now we argue that if B
a
∗(p) ≤ B
b
∗(p) for some p ≥ p
b
0,
then Ba∗(p
′) ≤ Bb∗(p
′) for p′ ∈ [p, p+ ǫ) for some ǫ > 0. Then we invoke the Meta-Lemma to extend
this to all p ≥ pb0. Now, in order to prove that we analyze two cases: if B
a
∗(p) < B
b
∗(p) then by
continuity of Ba∗ and B
b
∗ , there exists some ǫ > 0 such that B
a
∗(p
′) < Bb∗(p
′) for p′ ∈ [p, p+ ǫ). Now,
if Ba∗(p) = B
b
∗(p), then by Corollary 4.12, B
a
i (p) = B
b
i (p) for all agents i and moreover, the remnant
supply is the same Sa(p) = Sb(p), since S(p) =
∑
i∈A(p)
Bi(p)
p
− B∗(p)
p
. Notice that the evolution of
budgets in p′ ≥ p depends only on B(p) and S(p) and since those are equal for the augmented and
for the base auction, then Bai (p
′) = Bbi (p
′) for all p′ ≥ p. We say that at this point, the auctions get
fully coupled. This completes the discussion. The heart of the proof is to show that the maximum
budget of the base auction stays higher then the one in the augmented auction. If eventually they
meet, then the two auctions become fully coupled, in the sense that they evolve in the same way
from this price on.
Now, we want to establish allocation monotonicity, i.e., that xai (p) ≥ x
b
i (p) for all p ≥ 0. We will
prove a stronger claim, that the wishful allocation Ψi is monotone in the supply, i.e., Ψ
a
i (p) ≥ Ψ
b
i (p)
for all p ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.14 (Allocation Monotonicity) For all p ≥ 0 and all agents i, the following
invariant holds: Ψbi (p) ≤ Ψ
a
i (p).
Proof : This proof follows from combining Proposition 4.13 and Lemma 4.6. For small values of
p, Ψbi (p) ≤ Ψ
a
i (p) is definitely true, since both are equal to
Bi
p
. Now, if it is true for some small p,
then it is true for any p′ ≥ p, since:
Ψai (p
′) = Ψai (p)−
∫ p′
p
Bai (ρ)
ρ2
dρ ≥ Ψbi (p)−
∫ p′
p
Bbi (ρ)
ρ2
dρ = Ψbi (p
′).
The proof of our main theorem follows immediately from Propositions 4.13 and 4.14.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 : For the allocation monotonicity, Proposition 4.14 implies that xai (p) +
Bai (p)
p
≥ xbi (p)+
Bbi (p)
p
. Since Bai (p) ≤ B
b
i (p), then clearly: x
a
i (p) ≥ x
b
i (p), taking p→∞ we get that
for each player i, the final allocation in the augmented auction and in the base auction are such
that xai ≥ x
b
i .
The monotonicity of the payment function follows directly from Proposition 4.13. The remaining
budget in the end is larger in the base auction then in the augmented auction for each agent. So,
the final payments are such that πai ≥ π
b
i .
5 Qualitative Description of the Adaptive Clinching Auction
Once we established that the Adaptive Clinching Auction is an auction in the online supply model,
we have a feasible online allocation and pricing rule in our hands, i.e., a rule that tells how to
allocate and charge for an ǫ amount of the good when it arrives after s supply has already been
allocated. At this point, it is worth studying qualitative behavior of such an allocation rule, and
develop more insights that can guide us in the design of heuristic to apply in real-world ad auctions.
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We do this analysis in details for 2 players in Appendix E. We observe that for the first units
of supply, the clinching auction behaves like VCG: allocating to the highest bidder and charging
the second highest bid. After that, depending on the relation between v1 and v2, two distinct
behaviors can happen: either at a certain point the high value player gets his budget depleted, and
the auction starts allocating new arriving units to the low valued player (still charging for those
items) and then at a certain further point, it starts splitting the goods among them (charging only
the player with non-depleted budget). Or alternatively, the auction continues to allocate to the
high-valued player but start charging him a discounted version of VCG. Then when his budget
gets depleted, the auction starts splitting goods among the players (charging only the player with
non-depleted budget). We refer to Appendix E for a detailed discussion of the intuition behind this
online rule.
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A Missing Proofs in Sections 3 and 4
Lemma A.1 VCG is an auction in the strong online model for (FPM,4PM).
Proof : Assume that P f , P f
′
, P ′ are defined respectively by the monotone submodular functions
f, f ′, g. If P f
′
= P f + P ′, then by McDiarmid’s Theorem [13], f ′ = f + g.
Now, let’s remind how VCG allocated for this setting. If the polymatroid is defined by f , VCG
begins by sorting the players by their value (and breaking ties lexicographically). So, we can assume
v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Then it chooses the outcome:
xi = f([i])− f([i− 1])
πi = vi+1 · (f([i+ 1] \ i)− f([i− 1])− xi+1) +
∑
j>i+1
vj · (f([j] \ i)− f([j − 1] \ i)− xj)
where [i] is an abbreviation for {1, . . . , i}. Now, once we do this for f, f ′ we notice that the allocation
and payments for f ′ are simply the sum of the allocation and payments for f and g, hence they are
monotone along 4PM.
Proof of Lemma 4.6 : The function Ψi(p) is clearly continuous for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} and right-
continuous everywhere. Now, we claim that it is also left-continuous at vj , i.e., Ψ(vj−) = Ψ(vj).
This fact is almost immediate:
Ψi(vj) = xi(vj) +
Bi(vj)
vj
= [xi(vj−) + δi] +
[Bi(vj−)− δivj]
vj
= xi(vj−) +
Bi(vj−)
vj
= Ψi(vj−)
Calculating its derivative is also easy:
∂pΨi(p) = ∂p
[
xi(p) +
Bi(p)
p
]
= ∂pxi(p) +
∂pBi(p)
p
−
Bi(p)
p2
= −
Bi(p)
p2
since ∂pxi(p) =
S(p)
p
= −∂pBi(p)
p
.
Proof of the Meta Lemma 4.7 : Let F = {p ≥ p0; Λ doesn’t hold for p}. We want to show
that if the properties (a),(b),(c) in the statement hold, then F = ∅. Assume for contradiction that
(a),(b),(c) hold but F 6= ∅. Let p¯ = inf F , i.e., the smallest p¯ such that for all ǫ > 0, [p¯, p¯+δ)∩F 6= ∅
for all δ > 0.
Now, there are two possibilities:
(1) either p¯ /∈ F , in this case we can invoke (b) to see that there should be an ǫ > 0 such that
[p¯, p¯+ ǫ) ∩ F = ∅ which contradicts the fact that p¯ = inf F .
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(2) or p¯ ∈ F . By (a), we know p¯ > p0. Then we can use that by the definition of inf, Λ holds
for all p < p¯, so we can invoke (c) to show that Λ should hold for p¯. And again we arrive in a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.8 : The proof is based on the Meta Lemma. Part (a) is trivial.
For part (b), there is ǫ > 0 such that in [p, p + ǫ) the active set is the same as A(p). We will
show that if i ∈ C(p), then i ∈ C(p′) for all p′ ∈ [p, p+ ǫ), or in other words: S(p′) =
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj
p′
.
This equality holds for p. Now, we will simply show that the derivative of both sides is the same in
the [p, p+ ǫ) interval, i.e.: ∂pS(p) = ∂p
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
.
∂p
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
=
p[
∑
j∈A(p)\i ∂pBj(p)]−
∑
j∈A(p)\iBj(p)
p2
=
1
p
∑
j∈C(p)\i
∂pBj(p)−
1
p
S(p) =
= −
∑
j∈C(p)\i
1
p
S(p)−
1
p
S(p) = −
∑
j∈C(p)
∂pxj(p) = −
∑
j∈A(p)
∂pxj(p) = ∂pS(p)
For part (c), it is trivial for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} by left-continuity: if S(p
′) =
∑
j∈A(p′)\i
Bj
p′
for
p′ < p and the functions involved are left-continuous, then it holds for p. Now, for p = vj, if
S(vj−) =
∑
k∈A(vj−)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj
, then for δk as defined in (iii) of Definition 4.2 we have:
S(vj) = S(vj−)−
∑
k∈A(vj)
δk =

 ∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj−)− δkvj
vj

+ Bj(vj−)
vj
− δi =
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj)
vj
since:
δi =

S(vj−)− ∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj


+
=

 ∑
k∈A(vj−)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj
−
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj


+
=
Bj(vj−)
vj
Proof of Lemma 4.9 : Again we prove it using the Meta Lemma. (a) is trivial, for (b) if
S(p) <
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
, then by right-continuity the strict inequality continues to hold in some
region [p, p + ǫ). If S(p) =
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
we can do the same analysis as in Lemma 4.8. For (c)
it is again trivial for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} by left-continuity and for p = vj we use the fact that comes
directly from the proof of the previous lemma:
S(vj)−
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj)
vj
=

S(vj−)− ∑
k∈A(vj−)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj

+ Bj(vj−)
vj
− δi ≤ 0 (1)
by the definition of δi, since:
δi =

S(vj−)− ∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj


+
≥

S(vj−)− ∑
k∈A(vj−)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj

+ Bj(vj−)
vj
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Proof of Corollary 4.10 : If δi > 0, then, δi = S(vj−)−
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj−)
vj
. Substituting that
in equation (1) we get that S(vj) =
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(vj)
vj
and therefore i ∈ C(vj).
Proof of Lemma 4.11 : It is easy to see that all bidders in the clinching set have the same
remaining budget, since if i, i′ ∈ C(p), then
∑
j∈A(p)\i
Bj(p)
p
= S(p) =
∑
j∈A(p)\i′
Bj(p)
p
and therefore
Bi(p) = Bi′(p). Also, clearly, all players with the same budget will be in the clinching set. The fact
that the players clinching have the largest budget follows directly from Lemma 4.9.
B Proof of Proposition 4.13
Proof of Proposition 4.13 :
The first part of the proof consists of showing that clinching starts first in the augmented auc-
tion. Then we divide the prices in three intervals: in the first where no clinching happens in both
auctions, in the second where clinching happens only in the augmented auction and the third in
which clinching happens in both auctions. Then we prove the claim in each of the intervals.
First part of the proof: Clinching starts earlier in the augmented auction
Let pb0 = min{p;C
b(p) 6= ∅} and pa0 = min{p;C
a(p) 6= ∅}. We claim that pa0 ≤ p
b
0. In order to see
that, assume the contrary: pb0 < p
a
0. At p
b
0, there is one agent i such that S
b(pb0) =
∑
k∈A(pb
0
)\i
Bb
k
(pb
0
)
pb
0
.
If pb0 /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}, then by Corollary 4.10, no budget was spent in neither of the auctions at this
price and no goods were acquired, so Sb(pb0) = s
b, Sa(pb0) = s
a, Bbk(p
b
0) = B
b
k(0) and B
a
k(p
b
0) = B
a
k(0).
This implies that at this point Sa(pb0) > S
b(pb0) =
∑
k∈A(pb
0
)\i
Ba
k
(pb
0
)
pb
0
, which contradicts Lemma 4.9
for the augmented auction. Now, the case left to analyze is the one where pb0 = vj for some j 6= i
and i entered the clinching set after acquiring a positive amount of good δbi > 0 at price vj . Then:
δbi = s
b −
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bk(0)
vj
> 0. But in this case δai > 0, contradicting that p
a
0 > p
b
0.
Second part of the proof: Proof for the first interval [0, pa0).
For the p in the interval [0, pa0), no clinching occurs, so B
a
i (p) = B
a
i (0) = B
b
i (0) = B
b
i (p).
Third part of the proof: Proof for the second interval [pa0, p
b
0).
In the interval [pa0, p
b
0), some players are acquiring goods in the augmented auction but no player
is neither acquiring goods nor paying anything in the base auction, so: Bai (p) ≤ B
a
i (0) = B
b
i (0) =
Bbi (p).
Fourth part of the proof: Proof for the third interval [pb0,∞).
In this interval, both players are clinching. Now, we use the Meta Lemma to show that for all
p ≥ pb0, the property B
b
i (p) ≥ B
a
i (p) for all i holds.
For part (a) of the Meta Lemma, we need to show that Bbi (p
b
0) ≥ B
a
i (p
b
0). If p
b
0 /∈ {v1, . . . , vn}
this follows directly from continuity and the third part of the proof. If pb0 = vj for some j, then
by the previous cases we know that Bai (vj−) ≤ B
b
i (vj−). We have that B
a
i (vj) = B
a
i (vj−) − δ
a
i vj
and Bbi (vj) = B
b
i (vj−) − δ
b
i vj . Now we analyze the clinched amounts δ
a
i and δ
b
i . If p
a
0 = p
b
0, it is
straightforward to see that δai ≥ δ
b
i and therefore B
a
i (vj) ≤ B
b
i (vj). So, let’s focus on the case where
pa0 < p
b
0. For this case:
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δai =

Sa(vj−)− ∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bak(vj−)
vj


+
=

 ∑
k∈A(vj−)
Bak(vj−)
vj
−
Ba∗(vj−)
vj
−
∑
k∈A(vj)\i
Bak(vj−)
vj


+
=
=
[
Bai (vj−)
vj
+
Baj (vj−)
vj
−
Ba∗(vj−)
vj
]+
=
1
vj
[min{Bi(0), B
a
∗(vj−)}+min{Bj(0), B
a
∗ (vj−)} −B
a
∗(vj−)]
+
where the last step is an invocation of Corollary 4.12. For the base auction we have essentially
the same, except that Sb(vj−) ≤
∑
k∈A(vj−)
Bb
k
(vj−)
vj
−
Bb
∗
(vj−)
vj
holds as an inequality rather than
equality, so we get:
δbi ≤
[
Bbi (vj−)
vj
+
Bbj (vj−)
vj
−
Bb∗(vj−)
vj
]+
=
1
vj
[
min{Bi(0), B
b
∗ (vj−)}+min{Bj(0), B
b
∗(vj−)} −B
b
∗(vj−)
]+
In order to prove that Bai (vj) ≤ B
b
i (vj), we study two cases:
• Case A: Ba∗(vj−) ≤ B
a
j (0), i.e. B
a
j (vj−) = B
a
∗(vj−). In this case, δ
a
i =
Bai (vj−)
vj
and therefore
Bai (vj) = 0, so, it is trivial that B
a
i (vj) = 0 ≤ B
b
i (vj).
• Case B: Ba∗(vj−) > B
a
j (0). Now, consider the function Φ(β) = [min{β, µ} +min{β, γ} − β]
+
for β ≥ min{µ, γ}. This function is monotone non-increasing in such range. Now, take
µ = Bi(0), γ = Bj(0) and use that B
a
∗(vj−) ≤ B
b
∗(vj−) to conclude that δ
a
i = Φ(B
a
∗(vj−)) ≥
Φ(Bb∗(vj−)) ≥ δ
b
i . This implies B
a
i (vj) ≤ B
b
i (vj).
This finishes the proof of part (a) of the Meta Lemma.
Now, for part (b) of the Meta-Lemma, consider two cases:
• Ba∗(p) < B
b
∗(p), then by right-continuity of the budget function, there is some ǫ > 0 such
Ba∗(p
′) < Bb∗(p
′) for any p′ ∈ [p, p + ǫ).
• Ba∗(p) = B
b
∗(p), therefore, B
a
i (p) = B
b
i (p) for all i ∈ A(p), moreover, S
a(p) = Sb(p), since
Sa(p) =
∑
i∈A(p)
Bai (p)
p
−
Ba∗(p)
p
=
∑
i∈A(p)
Bbi (p)
p
−
Bb∗(p)
p
= Sb(p)
Since the behavior of the function B(·) for p′ ≥ p just depends on S(p) and B(p), for all
p′ ≥ p, then for all p′ ≥ p, Ba(p) = Bb(p). In other words, when Bb∗(p) and B
a
∗(p) meet, then
the auctions become fully coupled.
Part (c) of the Meta-Lemma is essentially the same argument made in item (a). This part is
trivial for p /∈ {v1, . . . , vn} by continuity of B(p). For p = vj we use that B
a
∗(vj−) ≤ B
b
∗(vj−) and
study δai and δ
b
i . As in (c) we get:
δai =
1
vj
[min{Bi(0), B
a
∗(vj−)}+min{Bj(0), B
a
∗ (vj−)} −B
a
∗(vj−)]
+
δbi =
1
vj
[
min{Bi(0), B
b
∗(vj−)}+min{Bj(0), B
b
∗ (vj−)} −B
b
∗(vj−)
]+
Now, by analyzing cases A and B as in part (a) of the Meta-Lemma, we conclude that Bai (vj) =
Bai (vj−)− vjδ
a
i ≤ B
b
i (vj−)− vjδ
b
i = B
b
i (vj) as desired.
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C Adaptive Clinching Auction with Repeated Values
In this section, we modify the auction given in Definition 4.2 to account for the possibility of
valuation profiles having repeated values, i.e., two agents i, i′ with vi = vi′ . The modification is
quite simple:
Definition C.1 (Adaptive Clinching Auction revisited) Given any valuation vector v, bud-
get vector B and initial supply s, consider functions xi(p), Bi(p) satisfying (i),(ii) and (iii) in
Definition 4.2 and also:
(iv’) for p = vj−, Let A˜ = A(vj−), x˜i = xi(vj−), B˜i = Bi(vj−) and S˜ = S(vj−). Now, run the
following procedure on (A˜, x˜, B˜, S˜):
◦ while there is j˜ ∈ A˜ with vj˜ = vj
◦ let j˜ be the lexicographic first of such elements
◦ remove j˜ from A˜
◦ define δk = S˜ −
∑
k∈A˜
B˜k
vj
for each k ∈ A˜
◦ update x˜k = x˜k + δk, B˜k = B˜k − δkvj for each k ∈ A˜
◦ update S˜ = S˜ −
∑
k∈A˜ δk.
and then set xi(vj) = x˜i, Bi(vj) = B˜i.
Notice this is essentially repeating (iv) in Definition 4.2 for as many times as elements with the
same value vj . Notice that all the proofs in Section 4 carry out naturally for this setting, simply
by repeating the same argument done for (iv) multiple times, showing that the invariants analyzed
are true after each while iteration.
D Algorithmic Form of the Adaptive Clinching Auction
We presented the Adaptive Clinching Auction in Definition 4.2 as the limit as p→∞ of a differential
procedure following Bhattacharya el al [4]. Here we present the same auction in an algorithmic
format, i.e., an O˜(n) steps procedure to compute (x, π) from (v,B, s). The idea is quite simple:
given a price p and the values of B(p), x(p), we solve the differential equation in item (i) of Definition
4.2 and using it, we compute the next point p¯ where either a player leaves the active set, or a player
enters the clinching set. Given that, we compute B(p¯−), x(p¯−). Then we obtain the values of
B(p¯), x(p¯) either by the procedure in (iv) if a player leaves the active set on p¯ or simply by taking
B(p¯) = B(p¯−) and x(p¯) = x(p¯−) otherwise.
Lemma D.1 Consider the functions x(p) and B(p) obtained in the Adaptive Clinching Auction. If
for prices p′ ∈ [p, p¯), the clinching and active set are the same, i.e., C(p′) = C(p) and A(p′) = A(p),
then given k = |C(p)|, the players i in the clinching set are such that:
• if k = 1, S(p′) = pS(p)
p′
, xi(p
′) = xi(p)+[S(p
′)−S(p)] and Bi(p
′) = Bi(p)+pS(p)[log p−log p
′].
• if k > 1, S(p′) = p
kS(p)
(p′)k
, xi(p
′) = xi(p)+
1
k
[S(p′)−S(p)] and Bi(p
′) = Bi(p)+
pkS(p)
k−1
[
1
p′k−1
− 1
pk−1
]
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Proof : The proof is straightforward. For the case of k = 1, we follow the discussion in Example
4.2: let i be the only player in C(p), then S(p′) + xi(p
′) is constant in this range, since all that is
subtracted from the supply is added to the allocation of player 1, therefore:
∂S(p′) = −∂pxi(p
′) = −
S(p′)
p′
⇒ S(p′) =
α
p′
.
using the boundary condition S(p) = α
p
, we get the value of α = pS(p). Now, clearly x(p′) =
x(p) + [S(p′)− S(p)], since player i is the only one clinching. For his budget:
Bi(p
′)−Bi(p) =
∫ p′
p
∂pBi(ρ)dρ =
∫ p′
p
−S(ρ)dρ =
∫ p′
p
−
pS(p)
ρ
dρ = pS(p)[log p− log p′]
For k > 1, S(p′) +
∑
i∈C(p′) xi(p
′) is constant and therefore:
∂S(p′) = −
∑
i∈C(p′)
∂pxi(p
′) = −k
S(p′)
p′
⇒ S(p′) =
α
(p′)k
.
Using the boundary condition S(p) = α
pk
, we get the value of α = pkS(p). We use the observation
in Lemma 4.11 that players in the clinching set have the same budget, and therefore the auction
treats them equally from this point on as long as they remain in the active set, i.e., they will get
allocated and charged at the same rate. Therefore: x(p′) = x(p)+ 1
k
[S(p′)−S(p)]. For the budgets:
Bi(p
′)−Bi(p) =
∫ p′
p
−S(ρ)dρ =
∫ p′
p
−
pS(p)
ρk
dρ =
pkS(p)
k − 1
[
1
(p′)k−1
−
1
pk−1
]
Theorem D.2 (Algorithmic Form) It is possible to compute the allocation and payments of the
Adaptive Clinching Auction in O˜(n) time.
Proof : Using the lemma above, we just need to compute x and B for the points where one of
the following events happen: (a) one leaves the active set and (b) one player enters the clinching
set. Clearly there are at most n events of type (a) and by Lemma 4.8 also at most n events of type
(b).
The algorithm starts at price p = 0 and at each time computes the next event. For example,
at price p = 0, the next event of type (a) occurs in p = mini vi. The next event of type (b) occurs
at price p = 1
s
[
∑
ABi −maxABi] if no event of type (a) happens before. First we compute which
one occurs first. Let p¯ be such a price. Then, computing B(p¯−), x(p¯−) is trivial, since no clinching
happened so far, so at that price: B(p¯−) = B (initial budgets) and x(p¯−) = 0. Now, if p¯ is an
event of type (a), then use step (iv) in Definition 4.2 to compute x(p¯), B(p¯). If not, simply take
B(p¯) = B(p¯−) and x(p¯) = x(p¯−).
From this point on, at each considered price p, the clinching set will be non-empty, so we know
the format of x(p′) and B(p′) for p′ ∈ [p, p + ǫ). If the next event that happens is of type (a), it
happens at min{vj ; vj > p}, if it is of type (b), it happens at min{p
′;B∗(p
′) = maxi′∈A(p′)\C(p′)Bi′},
where the expression for B(p′) is given in the previous lemma. For example, if |C(p)| = 1, then this
happens at:
p′ = exp
[
1
pS(p)
(B∗(p)−maxi′∈A(p)\C(p)Bi′(p)) + log p
]
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and if |C(p)| = k > 1, it happens at:
p′ =
pkS(p)
(k − 1)(B∗(p)−maxi′∈A(p)\C(p)Bi′(p)) + pS(p)
Those expressions are easily obtained by taking Bi(p
′) as calculated in the previous lemma and
calculating for which p′ it becomes equal to maxi′∈A(p)\C(p)B
′
i(p). Now, we simply need to find out
which of those events happen first. Let it be p¯, then we compute B(p¯−), x(p¯−) using the previous
lemma and then update to B(p¯), x(p¯) as described above.
E Details of the Qualitative Description
In Theorem 4.1, we showed that the Adaptive Clinching Auction is an auction in the online supply
model. It is natural to ask how allocation and payment qualitatively evolve as supply arrives. In
order words, how does it allocate and charge for an ǫ amount of the good when it arrives after
s supply has already been allocated. We perform in this section a qualitative analysis for two
players based on the explicit formula of the Adaptive Clinching Auction for n = 2 players derived
in Dobzinski et al [9] (which can alternatively be obtained from Theorem D.2). This is reproduced
in Figure 3.
As we will see, the clinching auction has a very natural behavior for the first few units of supply
that arrive - it simply allocates them using VCG. At a certain point, when budget constraints start
to kick-in, the allocation and payments evolve in a quite non-expected way. The main goal of this
section is to highlight this point.
Depending on the relation between v1 and v2, two distinct behaviors can happen: either at a
certain point, the high-value player gets his budget depleted, and the auction starts allocating new
arriving units to the low-value player (still charging for those items) and then at a certain further
point, it starts splitting the goods among them (charging only the player with non-depleted budget).
Or alternatively, the auction continues to allocate to the high-value player, but start charging him a
discounted version of VCG. Then when his budget gets depleted, the auction starts splitting goods
among the players (charging only the player with non-depleted budget).
Now, for some fixed pair of valuations v1, v2 and budgets B1 ≥ B2, we study how the allocation
and payments evolve with the available supply s. As one can easily see, if supply is sufficiently small
s ≤ mini Bimini v1 , the auction is essentially VCG, as the good arrives, it allocates it to the highest-value
player and she pays per unit the value of the other player. The behavior afterwards depends on the
relation between v1 and v2.
Case v2 ≥ v1 : As goods arrive, we allocate to the higher-value player charging him v1 per
unit. This is essentially VCG. This is possible until s = B2
v1
, when the budget of 2 is depleted. As
more goods arrive, we allocate them entirely to player 1 charging them at a rate proportionally
to B2
s
, i.e., the fraction between player 2’s original budget and supply that has arrived so far. We
continue doing that until s = 1
v1
B′1 =
1
v1
exp(B1
B2
− 1 + logB2). At this point, the remaining budget
of player 1 is the same as the original budget of player 1. From this point on, each amount of the
good that arrives is split among 1 and 2 at a rate ∂sx = (1 −
B2
2B′
1
+
B2B
′
1
2v2
1
s2
, B22B′
1
−
B2B
′
1
2v2
1
s2
). Player 2
is clearly not charged (since his budget is already depleted) and player 1 is charged at a rate
B′
1
B2
s2v1
per arriving unit of s. (The allocation is depicted in the first part of Figure 4.)
Case v2 < v1 : Again we start allocating like VCG, i.e., allocating the goods to player 1 and
charging him v2 for each unit of the good. We do that up to supply s =
B2
v2
. From this point on,
we continue allocating incoming goods to player 1, but we charge him at a cheaper rate than v2,
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v2 ≥ v1 and s · v1 ≤ B2
x = (0, s)
p = (0, sv1)
v2 ≥ v1 and B2 ≤ s · v1 ≤ B
′
1
x =
(
s− B2
v1
, B2
v1
)
p = (B2(log(sv1)− logB2), B2)
v2 ≥ v1 and B
′
1 ≤ s · v1
x =
(
s− sB22B′
1
[1 + (
B′
1
sv1
)2], sB22B′
1
[1 + (
B′
1
sv1
)2]
)
p =
(
B2(1−
B′
1
sv1
) +B2(logB
′
1 − logB2), B2
)
v2 < v1 and s · v2 ≤ B2
x = (s, 0)
p = (sv2, 0)
v2 < v1 and B2 ≤ s · v2 ≤ B
′
1
x = (s, 0)
p = (B2 +B2(log(sv2)− logB2), 0)
v2 < v1 and B
′
1 ≤ s · v2
x =
(
s+ sB22B′
1
[−1 + (
B′
1
sv2
)2], sB22B′
1
[1− (
B′
1
sv2
)2]
)
p =
(
B1, B2 −
B′
1
B2
sv2
)
Figure 3: Explicit formula of the Adaptive Clinching Auction for n = 2.
Valuations v1, v2, budgets B1 ≥ B2, initial supply s and B
′
1 = exp(
B1
B2
− 1 + logB2)
s
B2/v1 B
′
1
/v1
v2 ≥ v1
x1(s)
x2(s) s
x1(s)
x2(s)
B′
1
/v2
v2 < v1 v2 < v1
s
v1x1(s)
π1(s)
B2/v2 B
′
1
/v2
Figure 4: Evolution of allocations x1 and x2 as supply arrives in the cases v2 ≥ v1 (first plot)
and v2 < v1 (second plot). The third plot represents the evolution of value v1x1(s) and
payment π1(s) of player 1 as more supply arrives in the case v2 < v1.
precisely, we charge him at a rate B2
s
. We do so until the budget of 1 is depleted, which happens
at s =
B′
1
v2
. From this point on, we split the arriving goods between players 1 and 2 at a rate
∂sx = (1 −
B2
2B′
1
−
B2B
′
1
2v2
1
s2
, B22B′
1
+
B2B
′
1
2v2
1
s2
). Naturally, we cannot charge player 1, because his budget is
already depleted, but we charge player 2 at a rate
B′
1
B2
s2v2
per arriving unit of s. (The allocation is
depicted in the second and third part of Figure 4.)
Relation to bid throttling. One important remark is that the auction is not a special case of a
bid-throttling scheme, since an agent is allocated items even after his budget is completely depleted
and even if the other agent still has budget left. Intuitively, the fact that an agent got many
items for an expensive price in the beginning (once the items were scarce) gives him an advantage
over items in the future if/once they become abundant, i.e., this agent will have the possibility of
acquiring these items for a lower price compared to other agents.
The final goal of this research direction is to provide better simple heuristics to deal with budgets
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for real-world ad auctions. We believe that the qualitative analysis above hints to new heuristics to
manage budget constrained agents. We illustrate the effectiveness of such heuristic in the following
scenario: consider a set of advertisers competing for ad slots on queries for a highly volatile query,
say ‘sunglasses’. If weather is rainy, there are very few queries and budget constraints do not kick
in, but if weather is sunny, there is a high volume of queries and we would like to split the queries to
advertisers according to their budgets. Imagine now that the weather is completely unpredictable.
If the day starts rainy, very few queries arrive in the morning. It is unclear is the weather is changing
in the afternoon. If the search engine knew the weather in the afternoon, it could run second-price
auctions on modified bids to ensure that the high value players still have sufficient budget left in
the afternoon if it is sunny and would run second price on real bids if they knew the weather would
still be rainy. The heuristic proposed by clinching on the other hand, is completely agnostic to that
matter. It will allocate using VCG in the beginning. If the weather becomes sunny, it will give
items for cheaper for the high-valued players to compensate for the more expensive items acquired
in the beginning.
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